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FAITHFUL AGENT. INTEGRATIVE,
AND WELFARIST INTERPRETATION
by
Thomas W Merrill*
We are in the midst of a series of lively debates about how to interpret
enacted laws such as written constitutions and statutes. In
constitutional law, there is a spirited clash between "originalists" and
"nonoriginalists." In the statutory arena, we have a three-way battle
between "textualists," "intentionalists," and '~Pragmatists." A common
feature of these contending schools is an insistence on a single, correct
approach to interpretation. In this respect, however, each of these rival
theories deviates from the Practice of interpretation. Real world
interpreters-to a person-deploy a variety of interpretative methods
when they seek to resolve the contested meaning of authoritative texts.
The actual practice of interpretation is characterized by a plurality of
approaches to interpretation, as opposed to adherence to a unitary ideal.
This Essay is an effort to sketch out, in a preliminary fashion, a
typology of interpretative approaches, and to offer some suggestions about
how to develop a conception of interpretation that synthesizes these
different approaches. My hope is that this synthesis will provide a better
understanding of how the interpretation of enacted texts proceeds in
actualpractice, as well as a guide that provides at least a broad overview
of how it should proceed.
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INTRODUCTION

We are in the midst of a series of lively debates about how to
interpret enacted laws such as written constitutions and statutes. In
constitutional law, there is a spirited clash between "originalists" and
"nonoriginalists." In the statutory arena, we have a three-way battle
between "textualists," "intentionalists," and "pragmatists." A common
feature of these contending schools is an insistence on a single, correct
approach to inter-pretation. In this respect, however, each of these rival
theories deviates from the practice of interpretation. Real world
interpreters-to a person-deploy a variety of interpretative methods
when they seek to resolve the contested meaning of authoritative texts.
The actual practice of interpretation is characterized by a plurality of
approaches to interpretation, as opposed to adherence to a unitary ideal.
This Essay an effort to sketch out, in a preliminary fashion, a
typology of interpretative approaches, and to offer some suggestions
about how to develop a conception of interpretation that synthesizes
these different approaches. My hope is that this synthesis will provide a
better understanding of how the interpretation of enacted texts proceeds
in actual practice, as well as a guide that provides at least a broad
overview of how it should proceed.
I1. THREE MODES OF INTERPRETATION
Let me begin by offering a typology of modes of legal interpretation.
This is my own device for imposing some order on a burgeoning world of
interpretation theories. The typology is intended to encompass theories
of both constitutional and statutory interpretation. There are some
obvious differences between them, such as the much higher rate of
interaction between the enacting body and the interpreter in the
statutory realm relative to the constitutional one. But they also share
important common features, most prominently the understanding that
legal authority flows from a text which has been enacted following a
process that is recognized as conferring legal authority on that text.
My typology begins with three basic modes of interpretation. I call
them the faithful agent mode, the integrative mode, and the welfarist
mode. Because each mode has a number of subsidiary approaches, each
can he regarded as a family of interpretation theories. Often, you will not
be surprised to learn, the most vigorous disagreements occur within
families as opposed to across different ones. Nevertheless, each mode is
characterized by a distinctive theory of legitimacy-a different
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assumption about what it is that makes any particular interpretation
correct or incorrect, or better or worse than other interpretations.
A.

The FaithfulAgent Mode

Faithful agent theories adopt a principal-agent model of
interpretation. The interpreter is cast in the role of subordinate agent,
seeking in good faith to carry out the instructions of the lawmaker, who is
understood to be the principal.' The faithful agent conception of
interpretation is grounded in the command theory of law, associated with

John Austin and carried forward by the legal

positivists)2

Its roots lie in

the close association between political sovereignty and a particular
person-the king. At one time, the law literally was the command of the
king, to whom all subjects in tie realmn owed a duty of obedience. The
king over time morphed into the king-in-parliament, then to parliament
alone, then to the people acting in their collective capaiya oeeg
to elect representatives to legislate in their name. But the duty of
obedience of those subject to the sovereign command has remained, and
this, according to the faithful agent theory, describes the appropriate
function of the interpreter.
All faithful agent theories are originalist in the sense that the
meaning of the enactment is fixed at the time of its promulgation. This
follows from the understanding of law as sovereign command. If the task
of the interpreter is to uncover the meaning of the command, then it
would seem to follow that the interpreter must seek to determine the
meaning of the enactment when it became a command-that is, when it
was transformed from being a mere proposal into binding law by
operation of the rule of recognition.5
Because faithful agent theories are rooted in the understanding of
law as command, they conceive of law as the expression of an intelligent
mind." Consequently, interpretation is understood to be the task of

'See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel

J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus jurisdiction,

Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARv. L. REv. 2029, 2040 (2007).
2 See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE Or JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 1-30 (1832)

(defining law as the command of the sovereign); Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy
Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 731, 779-80 (2010) (noting the connection
between Austinian positivism and modem textualism).
3See
F.C. MONTAGUE, THE ELEMENTS Or ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 59, 148
(New ed., William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 2001) (1910).
'The evolution of the idea of the judge as faithful agent is skillfully traced in
PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY (2008). See id. at 42-43 (discussing the
shift from divine to human will as the basis for legal obligation).
'On the concept of the rule of recognition, see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAw 97-107 (1961) (arguing that laws impose duties distinct from moral obligations
insofar as they are promulgated according to a rule of recognition which gives them
binding force).
6 Austin was explicit about this. See AUSTIN, supra note 2, at 10 (defining law in its
most general signification to be "a rule laid down for the guidance of an intelligent
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decoding what this intelligent mind was trying to say. This creates a
problem when the sovereign is a multi-member body, like a legislature or
a people acting to ratify a constitutional provision. Different members of
the enacting body may have different reasons for supporting the
enactment, and these reasons may not sum to a common understanding
of what is being said.'
The internal divisions within the faithful agent camp can be
explained by different approaches to overcoming this "many minds"
problem. For present purposes, we can distinguish three sub-theories
within the faithful agent mode: textualism, intentionalism, and
purposivism. Textualists say that enactments should be interpreted in
accordance with the meaning an ordinary reader of the text would
attribute to it at the time of enactment." The problem of aggregating
multiple minds is circumvented by shifting from the enacting body to the
reader of the command, who is hypothesized to be "a skilled, objectivelyreasonable user of wod
" Intentionalists say enactments should be
interpreted in accordance with what the enacting body intended the
command to mean. Here, the problem of aggregation is overcome by
hypothesizing a corporate or collective intention. In one version of
intentionalism called imaginative reconstruction, the interpreter asks
what the enacting body would have collectively decided upon if, contrary
to fact, it had specifically addressed the disputed question of meaning.
Purposivists also call upon the idea of corporate or collective
understanding, but cast this at a higher level of generality or abstraction.
The task of the interpreter is to identify the general purposes of the
enacting body, understood to be a collection of "reasonable persons
pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably,""1 and then to resolve the

being by an intelligent being having power over him"). For modern restatements of
this proposition, see Joseph Raz, Intention in Interpretation, in THE AUTONOMY Or LAw:
ESSAYS ON LEGAL POSITIVISM 249, 260-61 (Robert P. George ed., 1996); Steven D.
Smith, Law Without Mind, 88 MICH. L. REv. 104, 117 (1989).
7This
insight is often attributed to modern public choice theory. See, eg.,
Kenneth A. Shepsie, Congresfs Is a "They,""Not an "It".-Legilative Intent as Oxymoron, 12
INT'L REv. L. & EcoN. 239 (1992). The insight is not new, however. See, e.g., Max
Radin, Statutory Interpretation,43 HARv. L. REv. 863, 870-71 (1930).
8Antonin
Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER Or INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 17 (1997).
9John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists.', 106 COLUM. L. REVr.
70, 75 (2006) (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory
Construction, 1I I-LsAxv. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 59, 65 (1988)). Cf. Caleb Nelson, What is
Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REv. 347, 354 (2005).
'S See Learned Hand, How Far is a judge Free in Rendering a Decision , in THE SPIRIT
OF LIBERTY 103, 105-10 (3d ed. 1974).
"See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
INTHE MAKING AND APPLICATION Or LAwA1374-81 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey eds., 1994).
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question of interpretation in the way that best ftulfills or realizes these
purposes.
B.

The Integrative Mode

Faithful agent theories should be reasonably familiar to anyone who
has followed debates about statutory or constitutional interpretation in
recent years. Integrative theories may be less familiar, although in
practice they are utilized extensively by interpreters, more so than
faithful agent theories.
Integrative theories reject the model of the interpreter as a faithful
agent of the enacting body. Instead, the interpreter is cast as a synthesizer
who draws on a variety of sources of meaning and who seeks to knit these
sources together in order to produce the meaning that has the best "fit"
with these sources. The sources of meaning for the integrative
interpreter include not only the text itself-which is of course of great
significance-but also previous judicial decisions construing the
provision in question, previous administrative interpretations, other
enactments containing similar provisions, and even substantive canons of
interpretation, which can be regarded for these purposes as distillations
of conventional wisdom bearing on the provision in question. 1 2 Various
metaphors have been offered to describe integrative interpretation, such
as Ronald Dworkin's suggestion that interpretation is like a process in
which different authors write successive chapters in a chain novel after
reviewing all the previous chapters written by others."
If the historical roots of the faithful agent model lie in the fealty that
every subject owes to the sovereign, then the historical roots of
4
integrative interpretation lie in the practice ofjudging at common law.'1
The sources of the common law were many, including Roman law,
custom, and isolated parliamentary enactments. But in its full flourishing
and archetypical. understandin 1. today, the common law is law embodied
in previous judicial decisions . ~'The task of the judge is to examine
previous rulings involving similar controversies, and to extract from these
pronouncements a rule of decision to govern the present case. The
method of the common law is generally what I call integrative-it seeks to
identify the decisional rule that provides the best fit or synthesis with
these various past pronouncements. Analogously, the integrative
interpreter looks not merely to the language of the enactment, but to
other sources, including most prominently, but not exclusively, previous

"See generally David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statu wr Interpretation,67
N.Y.U. L. REv. 921 (1992) (arguing that the cannons of interpretation promote
contintuity in the law).

See RONALD

DwoRKIN,

LAw's EmtPiRr 228-32 (1986).

See HAMBURGER, Supra note 4, at 127-41.

See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Is the Common Law
(1989) (book revriew).

LawV?,

77 CAL L. Rrv. 455, 455
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judicial expositions of the meaning of the enactment in order to extract a
decisional rule that fits or coheres with this larger set of data built up
over time.
Integrative inter-pretation is by its nature non-originalist. Suppose
the text is enacted at time T, and is then interpreted at time T,.If at time
T3an interpreter seeks to give meaning to the text by taking into account
both the text and the interpretation rendered at T2, such an interpreter
is necessarily adopting an interpretation that draws on material other
than the original understanding, which was fixed at T,. Integrative
interpretation thus inevitably evolves over time, in response to new
16
circumstances that require adjustments in previous understandings.
Originalists are keenly aware of this, and hence are hostile to anyX
approach to interpretation that gives significant authority to precedent.
The converse is also true: Any interpreter who gives significant weight to
precedent in interpreting a written enactment cannot claim to be a
thoroughgoing originalist.
Although the literature on integrative interpretation is less well
developed than the faithful agent literature, multiple versions of
integrative theory also exist. One version, which I will call Burkean

integration, 1 8

Posits

that the task of the interpreter is to evaluate the

variety of sources of meaning in order to identify' the understanding that
can most accurately be said to represent the current consensus view as to
what the law is. Obviously, every interpreter will be influenced by her or
his values and experiences, and must make evaluative judgments. But the
Burkean version of integrative interpretation asks the interpreter to
suppress different aspirations about what the law should be, and to seek
the view of the text that most accurately reflects the balance of informed

SIn the words of Peter Strauss, faithful agent interpretation conceives of
enacted law as "static judgment" whereas integrative interpretation views legal
enactments "as an element in the continuing evolution of law's fabric. . .. " Peter L.
Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds of Statute and Common Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 429,
437.17 See, e.g, Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 1-ARv. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 23, 24 (1994); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically CorruptingInfluence
of Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 289, 289 (2005).
"S On Burkean interpretation in constitutional law, see Thomas W. Merrill, Bork
v. Burke, 19 HARv.JL. & PUB. POL'y 509 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism,
105 MicH. L. REV. 353 (2006); Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean
Political Theory and ConstitutionalInterpretation,72 N.C. L. REST. 619 (1994).
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contemporary opinion.' ' It is, if you will, an approach that enshrines the
status quo as an implicit normative baseline for engaging in integration .
Another version, which I will call normative tite ration, is reflected
in the writings of Bill Eskridge and Ronald Dworkin . This version posits
that the integrative interpreter must not only seek to identify the
interpretation that provides the best fit with multiple previous sources of
meaning, but should also explicitly seek to synthesize these elements in a
way that produces the "best" result from the perspective of some theory
of the good. The layers of cake built up from text and precedent must be
held together, as it were, by a thick coat of icing composed of normative
theory. This type of integrative theory therefore partakes of features of
welfarist theory, to which I will address momentarily.
Now that I have described integrative interpretation, everyone
should recognize that it is quite widespread in practice. Constitutional
law, whether it be under the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment,
or the Equal Protection Clause, is dominated in practice by integrative
interpretation, in that parsing prior judicial precedent is much more
important in resolving disputed questions than is any theory of original
meaning, original intent, or original purpose .2 2 Many areas of statutory
interpretation are also thoroughly integrative, including the antitrust
laws, civil rights laws, and the securities laws 2 Integrative theory, I should
stress, is not limited to the integration of past judicial precedent. Any
approach to interpretation that puts heavy emphasis on other
enactments, administrative interpretations, congressional ratification,
substantive canons of interpretation, or customary norms or practices, is
an integrative theory, as I use the term.

"As Mel Eisenberg has argued, the common law includes not just formal legal
elements like precedent but also "social propositions" which condition and influence
the evolution of legal doctrine. See MELVIN AXON EISENBERG, THE NATURE~ OF THE
COMMON LAw 14-42 (1988). A Burkean interpreter will not disregard such
propositions, but will take her cues from existing consensus about what is socially
permissible, rather than adopting some ideal moral theory.
20 In this sense, Cass Sunstein's recent embrace of "Burkean Minimalism" is
ironic, given that he previously invested great energy condemning modes of
interpretation that adopt "status quo" baselines. See, e.g, Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the
Rppublican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988).
2' WILLIAM
N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994);
DwORKIN, supra note 13, at 225-75.
22 See David A. Strauss, Common Law ConstitutionalInterpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REv.
877 (1996).
21 See, eg., Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 1, at 2042 (describing the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the habeas corpus statute as more closely approximating
what I call the integrative mode rather than the faithful agent mode of
interpretation).
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C. The Welfarist Mode
If faithful agent theories are familiar from debates about
interpretation, and integrative theories are familiar in practice, what do I
mean by welfarist theories of interpretation? Welfarist theories are quite
simply those that justify interpretation in terms of its impact on social
welfare. The term is new, but the concept, in one form or another, has
been around for a long time. The basic idea is that decisions by persons
24
in authority should be justified in terms of their consequences . We are
all familiar with judging the actions of elected officials and administrative
agencies this way. We assess the way they exercise their discretionary
authority in terms of whether these actions advance or retard the wellbeing of the persons these officials serve. Welfarist interpretation extends
the same framework of evaluation to the practice of interpreting enacted
texts.
Welfarists typically begin by pointing out that insofar as the meaning
of the text is unclear, the interpreter inevitably exercises discretion in
determining what it means. This exercise of discretion, like every other
exercise of discretionary authority by government officials, should be
judged in terms of its consequences. If legislators are judged by whether
they enact good or bad law, and presidents are judged by whether they
adopt good or bad policies for implementing laws, then courts and other
interpreters should be judged by whether they propound good or bad
interpretations of laws.
The historical model for welfarist interpretation is not entirely clear.
In constitutional law the model welfarist decision is probably Brown v.
Board of Education. 2 5 Brown, you will recall, justified its conclusion that
segregated public schools are unconstitutional by citing social science
research findings that segregation is damaging to the self esteem of
African-American school children. 26 Today, decisions like Brown are more
likely to be justified in terms of propositions of political morality, political
justice, or human rights. The notion is that there are certain universal
moral truths that interpreters should draw upon in construing vagrue
constitutional texts like the Equal Protection Clause.2
Although
practitioners of this style of argument might regard it as demeaning to
characterize these perceived moral imperatives as welfarist, I think it is
21

See, e.g., Louis

KAPLow & STEVEN SHAvELL, FAIRNESs VERSUS WELFARE

16 (2002);

Matthew D. Adler & Chris William Sanchirico, Inequality and Uncertainty: Theory and
Legal Applications, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 279, 282 (2006).
2' 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
26 Id. at 494 ("To separate [minority children] from others of similar age
and
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their
status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever
to be undone."); see also id. at 494-95 n.IlI (citing recent social science literature in
support of this conclusion).
27 See, e.g, Ronald Dworkin, Da~win's New Bulldog, 11 HARv. L. REv. 1718, 173132 (1998).
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fair to do so since these claims rest on arguments that texts should bear
certain meanings because of the consequences for human well-being.
The point is that welfarism, at least as I use the term, need not be
conceived in narrow utilitarian or cost-benefit terms, but can also be
framed in terms of timeless and transcendent moral imperatives-and
281
often is in the world of constitutional theory.
Welfarist interpretation has come to statutory interpretation
literattire only very recently. Here the implicit model-or at least
inspiration-may be interpretation by modern administrative agencies.
In the aftermath of the Chevron decision,'2) agencies have come to be
regarded as exercising discretionary policy authority when they interpret
statutes .3 0 A succession of Presidents has encouraged agencies to
discharge this discretion by using formal cost-benefit analysis.:3' The net
result is a model of interpretation in which the interpreter seeks to fill
gaps and ambiguities in enacted texts by adopting meanings that best
promote the social welfare, understood to be the interpretation that
produces the greatest social benefit net of costs. Once we become
comfortable with this characterization of agency interpretation, it is a
short step-for the academically inclined at least-to think of judicial
interpretation in similar terms. 3
If one follows the welfarists in conceiving of interpretation as the
exercise of discretionary authority, then one can quickly become
impatient with more conventional faithful agent or integrative theories.
Faithful agent and integrative theories sharply constrain the range of
outcomes that interpreters can embrace. Faithful agent interpretation is
constrained by the instructions laid down by the enacting body-often a
bunch of long-dead white males who entertained ideas that no longer
resonate today. Integrative interpretation is constrained by the
accuimulated weight of past practice and understandings, which again
may reflect the dead hand of the past, not to mention the accidents of
path dependency that characterize any practice grounded in following

" Constitutional theorists sometimes call this "perfectionism." See James E.
Fleming, The Incredible Shrinking Constitutional Theoly: From the Partial Constitution to the
Mihnimal Constitution, 75 FoRDHAm L. REv. 2885, 2887-97 (2007). Recent examples
would include JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: THE CASE Or
AUTIONOMY (2006); LAARENCE G. SAGER,JUSTIcE INPLAINCLOTHES (2004).
"' Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
30 See, e.g., RichardJ. Pierce,Jr., Chevron and its Aftermath:judicial Review of Agency
Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REv. 301, 304 (1988) (arguing that
Chevron divides statutory interpretation into questions of law and questions of policy).
SI
See, eg, Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the
Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1260, 1263-68 (2006) (describing the recent
history of the Office of Management and Budget's review of agency rulemaking
pursuant to presidential executive orders).
32 For a model of judicial interpretation that appears to derive from the postChevron conception of agency interpretation, see FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (2009).
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precedent. If the ultimate touchstone for justifying the exercise of
coercive governmental authority is the social welfare, then why shouldn't
the interpretation of texts also be guided by considerations of social
welfare? As should be obvious, welfarist interpretation is thus both nonoriginalist and deeply. skeptical of precedent as a basis for resolving
questions of interpretation.3
Like faithful agent theories and integrative theories, welfarist
theories come in a variety of sizes and shapes. As I have already noted,
one strand of welfarist interpretation, which appears primarily in
constitutional interpretation, can be characterized as a form of natural
law or human rights theory. Another prominent strand, which has been
tirelessly promoted by judge Richard Posner, goes by the name of
In Posner's version of pragmatism, welfare tends to be
pragmatism.
defined in terms of cost-benefit analysis. An interesting variation on this
version of welfarism, associated with Adrian Vermeule, can be called
institutional choice welfarism .' This would resolve interpretational
questions by making generalized judgments about which institution is
most likely to make interpretations that maximize benefits net of costs,
and adopting whatever interpretation is offered by that institution. One
can imagine other forms of welfarism as well, such as "critical" theories of
interpretation that emphasize the need to interpret texts giving special
attention to the perspectives of historically disadvantaged groups.

I have presented faithful agent, integrative, and welfarist
interpretation as ideal types, and one can find interpretative theorists
who closely correspond to one of these types or to one of the sub-types
within one of these families of theory. Yet if one looks at real world
interpreters-which for these purposes I mean primarily judges-a
striking fact quickly emerges: There are no pure types among real world
interpreters. Someone like justice Scalia can put heavy emphasis on
faithful agent interpretation in his extrajudicial writing and in some of
his opinions. But when you look at a larger sample of his opinions, you
find that he also makes heavy use of integrative and even welfarist

SSee, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, How 7JUDGES THINK 247 (2008) (characterizing
many precedents as "the weakened descendants of overbred aristocrats" due for
"critical reexamination").
"' See generally, id. For some earlier versions of Posnerian pragmatism, see, for
example, RICHARD A. POSNER, LAw, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 57-96 (2003);
Rid-lARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING L-Aw 387-405 (1995); and RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
PROBLEMS OFJURISPRUDENCE 454-69 (1990).
15 See generally ADRIAN VERMEULEJUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL
THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION
36

(2006).

See generally Scalia, supra note 8.
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arguments. 7 Or when you look at the work of judge Posner, you will find
heavy emphasis on welfarist interpretation in his extrajudicial writing.
But even when speaking extrajudicially, he introduces qualifications
grounded in faithful agent and integrative ideals. 38 And of course, his
opinions make use of faithful agent arguments and integrative
This suggests that what is
arguments, as well as welfarist aruet.3
needed is some kind of synthesis of these modes of interpretation, a
meta-theory, if you will, that helps us identify the proper domain of each
of these modes of interpretation and what their relationship to each
other should be.
111. SOME CONSIDERATIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
Before conisiderinig what such a meta-theory might look like, I will
offer some preliminary analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the
three respective modes of interpretation. These comments are grounded
in general observations about the design of our political institutions, and
in particular, the role that democratic or representational institutions
play in the overall structure of our constitutional government.
A.

The Primacy of FaithfulAgent Interpretation

There are, I believe, two powerful arguments grounded in the design
of our political institutions that support the use of a faithful agent
approach to interpretation of enacted texts.
First, faithful agent interpretation is necessary in order to preserve
the bedrock principle of our constitutional government-popular
sovereignty. The relationship between faithful agent interpretation and
popular sovereignty is usually stated in backward-looking terms.
Authoritative legal texts are enacted by the people or by the people's
representatives, and therefore those who implement and enforce these
texts must act as faithful agents of the enactors in order to assure that the
will of the people is respected. This backward-looking perspective has the
unfortunate tendency to degenerate into quibbling over whether the

"See, e.g, W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 88-92 (1991) (Scalia,

J.) (resolving ambiguity about whether "attorneys fees" includes expert witness fees by
examining other statutes); BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 544-45 n.8
(1994) (Scalia, J.) (resolving ambiguity about valuation of foreclosed real estate for
federal bankruptcy purposes by invoking the need to promote the "security and
stability of title to land").
38 See POSNER, supra note 33, at 246 (acknowledging that it is necessary to insist
on "jurisdictional niceties" such as deadlines for filing appeals).
39 See, eg., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Traditional Versus Economic Anatysis: Evidence
from Cardozo and Posner Torts Opinions, 62 FLA. L. REv. 667, 669 (2010) (conicludinig
that althotugh economic analysis is the "predominant characteristic of Posner
opinions," he has also "shown traditional skills of a legal craftsman and shrewd
rhetorician").
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Constitution and old statutes are truly "democratic." After all, women
and African-Americans could not vote when the Constitution was
allegiance to
adopted. Why do those living today owe any duty of 40
decisions made by a narrow subset of society now long dead?
The powerful relationship between popular sovereignty and faithful
agent interpretation is more easily made by turning the focus around and
adopting a forward-looking perspective. We can ask, what guarantee do
the people of today and tomorrow have that their wishes will be honored
by those who implement and enforce the law? If the people speak, how
do they know the interpreters will listen? We need faithful agent
interpreters so that people living now and in the future can have
confidence that if they assert their will-either by amending the
Constitution or by enacting new laws-their wishes will be faithfully
carnied out by those who interpret the law. Without a basic commitment
to faithful agent interpretation, the exercise of governmental authority
by the people becomes illusory. A democratic uprising by the people
would be regarded at best as an opinion poll to be weighed by those who
interpret the law. At worst, it would be an empty exercise in futility to be
ignored in the name of some higher or truer law discerned by the
interpreters but invisible to the masses.
Let me offer a simple example to illustrate the point. About twenty
years ago, the Supreme Court decided that burning the United States
flag is protected speech under the First Amendment to the
Many people were upset by these decisions. An
Constitution.'
amendment to the Constitution was proposed providing: "The Congress
and the States shall have power to prohibit the physical desecration of
the
the flag of the United States. 4 The amendment failed to 4Farner
required two-thirds vote in either the House or Senate . Suppose,
contrary to fact, that it was approved by both chambers, and was then
ratified by three-fourths of the States. Had this happened, the
amendment would have become part of the basic law of the United
States.
Suppose further that after this amendment is ratified, a protestor is
prosecuted for flag burning, and his case goes before the Supreme
Court. The protestor urges the Court to overturn his conviction, cleverly
arguing that the words of the flag burning amendment only empower
Congress to legislate, but do not expressly direct the Court to enter
judgments of conviction. Invoking various integrative and welfarist

40

For an overview of arguments and citations to the relevant literature, see Adam

M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REv.
606 (2008).
"' See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 312 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 399 (1989).
42 H.R.J. Res. 350, 101st Cong. (1989); S.J. Res. 332, 101st Cong. (1990).
13 Charles Tiefer, The Rag-Burning Controversy of 1 989-1990:- Congress' Valid Role in
ConstitutionalDialogue, 29 HARv.J. ON LEGis. 357, 377-78 (1992).
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arguments, the defendant tells the Court that the "best" interpretation of
the amendment is that it does not bind the Court to uphold convictions
that violate the Court's own conception of freedom of speech . How
should the Court rule?
To me, the answer is obvious. The people have spoken. They are
entitled to amend the Constitution, and have done so in the prescribed
manner. Whether a majority of the Court agrees with the amendment or
not, the Court is duty-bound to give effect to the amendment as the
faithful agent of the sovereign people. To adopt an argument that would
defeat the clear objective of the amendment would be to subvert the
legal order, and in particular to deny the people the ultimate power to
control their legal destiny. In effect, the Court would be asserting itself as
the ultimate lawgiver in the society, immune from control save by
impeachment, retirement, or revolution. I have no doubt that every one
of the currently sitting justices would reach the same conclusion. They
would affirm the conviction, no matter how wrong-headed they regarded
the amendment.
What this example tells uis, I think, is that the structure of our legal
order, grounded as it is on an assumption of popular sovereignty,
requires that interpreters recognize a core of cases in which they must act
as faithful agents. In the argot of statutory interpretation, it tells us that
when an interpreter concludes that the enactment has a plain meaning,
the interpreter is duty-bound to give effect to that meaning as the faithful
agent of the enacting body. The example does not tell us whether the
interpreter is to use the techniques of textualism, intentionalism,
purposivism, or some combination thereof, in undertaking the inquiry
into whether the enactment has a plain meaning. But it gives us a fixed
point of reference and awards a primacy of place to the faithful agent
mode of interpretation relative to the other contenders.
There is a second and distinct argument for interpreting enacted
texts as the faithful agent of the enacting body, which complements the
argument regarding popular sovereignty. Faithful agent interpretation is
critical to maintaining stability and coherence in our system of
government. We can call this the coordinating function of enacted law
As Jack Balkin has pointed out, the Constitution contains a number of
rule-like Tpropositions
whose meaning is plain and which no interpreter
contests.~ The list of uncontested propositions would include: each state
has two Senators; Representatives serve two year terms; Senators and
Representatives are directly elected; federal judges are nominated by the
41Cf.
Jeff Rosen, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitutional?, 100 YALE L. J.
1073, 1074 (1991) (arguing that the amendment would be unenforceable unless it
expressly denied that "speech is a natural ight").
1See
FREDERICK SCHAUER, P[AYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION
OF RULE-BASED DEcISION-MAKING IN LAw ANDrIN LIFE 162-66 (1991).
"Jack M. Balkin, Fidelity to Text and Principle, in THlE CONSTITUTION IN 2020 11, 12
(Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009).
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President; Presidents must be at least 35 years old, and so forth. These
rule-like provisions are fairly numerous; we do not think about them very
often precisely because they are uncontested. More importantly, they
create a skeletal framework for government. They do not supply a
complete flesh and blood constitution, in the sense of a complete
description of the principles that govern the operations of government.
But the rule-like provisions of the Constitution can be said to provide the
bones on which the flesh and blood are attached. Take away the bones,
and the body politic would collapse, or at least would be radically
destabilized.
An analogous point can be made about important statutes. Laws that
create government bodies or prescribe the powers and limits of
government bodies, commonly called organic acts, play an extremely
critical role in the functioning of our government. These laws, like the
Constitution, contain many rule-like propositions that are plain and
uncontested. For example, the Federal Communications Act tells us
there will be something called the Federal Communications Commission,
or the FCC; that it has authority to issue broadcasting licenses; that it is
unlawful to operate a transmitter without an FCC license, and so forth .
Only the legislature has authority to create such institutions and confer
governmental power upon them. The President and the courts cannot
declare, on their own authority, that there will be an FCC.4S And when
the legislature has acted to create institutions and prescribe their powers,
it is critical that those who act in the name of the government follow the
rule-like propositions that the legislature has laid down. If the
interpreters of such laws did not carry out these instructions as faithful
agents, the result would be significant instability.
I am not claiming, of course, that every provision in the Constitution
or every provision of every important statute should be regarded as some
kind of rule having a plain meaning. Obviously, many provisions are
broad generalities. These broad generalities have to be interpreted, and
they have long been interpreted in ways that are very difficult to
characterize as exercises in faithful agent interpretation. The point is
simply that the Constitution-as well as eveiy organic statute that
establishes an agency or institution of government-contains a large
number or structural or organizational rules whose meanings are plain. If
interpreters did not enforce these rules in accordance with their
uncontested meaning, it would be difficult to establish a system of
government characterized by the rule of law.
Powerful empirical support for the primacy of faithful agent
interpretation is supplied when we examine the many interpretative
theories that have been advanced in recent years. When we scrutinize
these theories closely, we find that most start with the acknowledgement
"See 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 307, 318 (2006).
4See Thomas W. Merrill, The DisposingPower of the Legislature 110 COLUM. L. Rr\'.
452, 456 (2010).
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that the interpreter is bound to enforce the plain meaning of
authoritative texts.i The dispute is over what the interpreter is supposed
to do when the meaning is not plain. This is a tacit acknowledgement that
the role of the interpreter, at its core, is that of a faithful agent of the
enacting body. When and if the lawgiver manages to speak plainly, the
interpreter dutifuilly complies with the instruction that has been given.
This means that the role of the interpreter, at its core, is that of a faithful
agent.
The nearly universal authority that interpreters ascribe to texts with
plain meanings, however, also reveals the key weakness of faithful agent
theories. If all texts had plain meanings, then everyone would engage in
nothing but faithful agent interpretation, and there would be no need
for interpretative theory. But obviously, all texts do not have plain
meanings. And when texts do not have plain meanings, faithful agent
theorists must look elsewhere in order to give meaning to the enactment.
One move here is to shift from the text to the intentions or the purposes
of the enacting body and to seek to derive meaning by asking how the
text should be interpreted in order to advance these intentions or
purposes. Another, more common, move is to draw upon the techniques
associated with the integrative mode of interpretation.
B.

The Ubiquity of Integrative Interpretation

If interpretation must be built on a foundation of faithful agency,
then it is also important to acknowledge the ubiquity of integrative
interpretation. With respect to the interpretative issues of greatest
con troversy-including those that surround the meaning of the broad
clauses of the Constitution like the Commerce Clause or the Equal
interpretation is a much more
Protection Clause-integrative
descriptively accurate characterization of actual practice than is faithful
agent interpretation 5 Faithful agent theorists seem not to know what to
do with this awkward truth. They acknowledge that precedent and
evolved understanding may serve as a constraint on the faithful agent

" See, e.g, Balkin, supra note 46, at 17-18; CROSS, supra note 32, at 12; FINER
58 (2008); VERMEuLE, supra note 35, at 1.

ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES

Dworkin may be an exception to this generalization. His most recent work merges
legal and moral interpretation into a single unified inquiry, suggesting perhaps that a
plain legal text would have to give way to a contrary principle of morality. See
Lawrence B. Soltim, The Unity of Interpretation, 90 B. U. L. Rrv. 551, 555 (2010).

5See MICHAEL

J.

GERH-ARDT, THE POWETR OF PRECEDENT

79 (2008) (using case

analysis and social science research to show the importance of precedent in Supreme
Court decision-making); Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional
Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 730-34 (1988) (describing the Supreme Court's
integrative interpretation of New Deal legislation).
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interpreter. But this is treated as an unpleasant concession to reality,5'
rather than a feature of the interpretative landscape that needs to be
integrated into a more comprehensive conception of interpretative
practice.
In practice, integrative interpretation exerts a very powerful
gravitational force, a force so powerful that no interpreter can afford to
ignore it. In support of this claim, I offer a remarkable exchange at the
beginning of the oral argument in McDonald v. City of Chicago, which
occurred in the Supreme Court on March 2, 20O10.53 McDonald presented
the question of whether the Second Amendment, as interpreted in
District of Columbia v. Heller," applies to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment. 5 5 Faithful agent interpreters had been greatly heartened by
Heller, where it seemed that both the majority and the principal
dissenting opinion looked primarily to the original meaning of the
Second Amendment in deciding whether that provision recopnizes an
individual's right to bear arms for self-defense in the home.' Lawyers
with a strong commitment to originalism assumed that the Court would
therefore also be open to faithful agent interpretation in deciding
whether to apply Heller to the States. What this would mean, according to
the dominant view among originalists, is that the Court would look to the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as a basis
for determining whether Heller applies to the States, because the authors
of the Fourteenth Amendment assumed the Privileges or Immunities
Clause would be the vehicle for incorporation.
This in turn would
require that the Court overrule the Slaughter-House Caes,58 which had
interpreted the Privileges or Immunities Clause narrowly as not
incorporating all the rights embodied in the first eight amendments to
the Constitution, including of course the Second Amendment.59
Counsel for the petitioners in McDonald, Alan Gura, began his
presentation by urging the Court to look to the Privileges or Immunities
Clause to decide the issue before it.6 Chief justice Roberts quickly
interjected, "Of course, this argument is contrary to the Slaughter-House
cases, which have been the law for 140 years.... [II] t's a heavy burden for

"See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. GIN. L. REv. 849, 862
(1989) (defending originalism but acknowledging that "most originalists are fainthearted" when it comes to overturning settled precedent).
52 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
"Transcript of Oral Argument, McDonald v'. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020
(2010) (No. 08-1521).
"128 S. Ct. 2'783 (2008).
55McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026.
5'Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2788-89; id. at 2822 (StevensJ, dissenting).
1See, eg., AKHIL REED AmAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 163-214 (1998).
"83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
51 Id. at 82.
0Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 53, at 3.
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you to carry to suggest that we ought to overrule that decision.""' Gura
regrouped and suggested that the Slaughter-House decision was entitled to
little respect as a precedent, because "there is a great consensus that it
was simply not decided correctly," that is, not decided correctly from an
originalist point of view.6 Then came this bombshell from justice Scalia:
"[W] hy are you asking us to overrule 150, 140 years of prior law, whenwhen you can reach your result under substantive due [process]-I
mean, you know, unless you are bucking for a-a place on some law
school fauly ..
The transcript at this point indicates,
"(Laughter). "64Justice Scalia then continued:
What you argue is the darling of the professoriate, for sure, but it's
also contrary to 140 years of our jurisprudence. Why do you want to
undertake that burden instead of just arguing Substantive due
process, which as much as I think it's wrong, I have-even I have
acquiesced in it?65
When the proposition that the
Again, the transcript says, "(Laughter) .
Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with its original
meaning elicits two laugh lines from justice Scalia, you know the faithful
agent perspective is in trouble.
What is going on here? How can justice Scalia, one of the foremost
proponents of originalism in constitutional law6 and the author of the
originalist majority opinion in Heller, mock the originalist position in
McDonald as "the darling of the professoriate"? The answer has to be that
overturning the Slaughter-House Cases-and with them, the basis for
determining which provisions of the Bill of Rights apply to the States and
which do not-would simply be too unsettling to the system of
constitutional law that the Court has developed in the many decades
since that decision was rendered. Even a committed originalist like
justice Scalia recognizes that the Court is not about to pull the rug out
from under 140 years of jurisprudence, with all sorts of collateral
consequences, many not entirely foreseeable.68
To revert to an earlier metaphor, if the rule-like provisions of the
Constitution and organic laws are the skeleton on which the body politic
rests, then accumulated understandings that have attached to that
Id. at 4.

61
62id
6"

Id. at 6-7.

'4Id.
65

id.

at 7.

66id

See Scalia, suPranote 51; Nelson, supra note 9, at 347.
m6As foreshadowed by his remarks at oral argument, justice Scalia joined the
plurality opinion in McDonald, relying on the Due Process Clause as the basis for
incorporation. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Only justice Thomas was willing to overrule the Slaughter-House Cases
and ground incorporation in the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Id. at 3058-88
(ThomasJ, concurring in judgment).
67
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skeleton and grown over time are the muscle, blood, and vital organs of
the body politic. To excise these understandings root and branch-based
on some view of the correct original understanding or otherwise-would
jeopardize the body politic no less than would ignoring the rule-like
propositions that have always been uncontested. History has its claims,
not merely in terms of founding moments, but also in terms of
everything that has transpired between the founding and the present.
This is the key insight of the integrative approach.
Integrative interpretation has another advantage, which hearkens
back to our consideration of the need to preserve the fundamental
institutional design postulate of popular sovereignty and its corollary,
representative government. Integrative interpretation, especially in its
Burkean version, promotes stability in law. Interpretation of the law
changes slowly and organically, rather than in fits and starts. This gives
the relatively more representative institutions, like the legislature, a clear
target when considering whether to make changes in the law. Also, if
interpretation is plodding and resistant to change-as it is more likely to
be under the integrative model-then those who seek change in the law
will have an incentive to take their case to forums where change is more
likely to occur. The principal candidates for such change, again, are the
69
relatively more representative institutions, such as the legislature . In
short, integrative interpretation is likely to promote change through
bottom-up democratic means, as opposed to change through
interpretation, which tends to be top-down and elitist. In this respect,
integrative interpretation reinforces the basic principle of democratic
institutional design.
Like faithful agent theories, integrative theories have their points of
vulnerability. One has already been alluded to. If the sovereign people
rise up and reject the settied understandings of the law that are reflected
in integrative understanding, then interpreters are bound to respect the
judgment of the people, not the collected wisdom of the ages. Integrative
interpretation is therefore subordinate to plain meanings of enacted
texts. For example, if the Fourteenth Amendment were amended to say
in so many words that the first eight amendme~nts of the Constitution
apply to the States, the Slaughter House Cases and 140 years of
accumulated jurisprudence would have to be overruled, whatever
destabilizing consequences this might introduce .

"' See Thomas W. Merill, Originalism, Stare Decisis and the Promotion of Judicial
Restraint, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 275-76 (2005).
70 Originalists argue of course that this was the intended meaning of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause in 1868. But the evidence on this point, although
considerable, is not conclusive. If the original Fourteenth Amendment had said in so
many words that the first eight Amendments apply to the States, then integrative
interpretation would have to yield to this directive. But if the Fourteenth Amendment
plainly said that, then the Slaughter-House Cases would never have been decided as they
were.
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Another weakness of integrative interpretation is that it often cannot
provide any guidance as to how to interpret an ambiguous text on the
first occasion it comes before the court or other body for inter-pretation.
One cannot rely on precedent when no precedent exists. 71 Conceivably,
other integrative tools such as references to previous or subsequent
enactments, administrative interpretations, or substantive canons could
be called upon for assistance. But one can readily imagine circumstances
in which a tribunal is faced with nothing more than the ambiguous
language of a recently enacted text that must be given some meaning. If
the interpreter only knows how to do integrative interpretation, then the
interpreter will not know how to proceed. Clearly then, integrative
interpretation is also incomplete and must be supplemented, at least in
some cases, by either some non-text-based version of faithful agent
interpretation-like
intentionalism
or purposivism-or
welfarist
interpretation.
C. The Limited Domain of Welfa-rist Interpretation
When we get to welfarist interpretation, the disadvantages
significantly outweigh the advantages, or so it seems to me. There are two
issues of overriding concern. One is whether interpreters of authoritative
texts-including here not just Supreme CourtJustices (who tend to have
above average skills) but all other federal and state judges (who tend to
have skills closer to the average lawyer) plus the lawyers in general
counsels' offices in various federal and state agencies-have the ability to
engage in welfarist analysis. I think it is fair to say that the skill set of
judges and lawyers, as a class, is well suited to engaging in faithful agent
and integrative modes of inter-pretation. Certainly one can ask: What
other branch of government decision-makers would likely do better?
Would the members of the legislature or the heads of executive
departments do better in figuring out what authoritative texts mean,
based on a careful analysis of the language used and its historical
context? Would these political actors show greater thoroughness and
insight in dissecting past precedents and other integrative sources? I
think the answer must be surely not. So we can at least be confident that
faithful agent and integrative modes of interpretation are well suited to
the skill set of those we typically charge with the task of interpretation.
I am, however, deeply skeptical of the claim that those who are
conventionally charged with interpretation would be equally adept at
welfarist interpretation. This is easiest to see if we consider judge
Posner's proposal that judges should interpret ambiguous texts so as to
maximize social benefits net of costs. Suppose you were tasked with
producing a cost-benefit analysis of a policy proposal like health care or

"
Cf. Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: Text, Precedent,
and Burke, 57 ALA. L. REV. 635, 639 (2006) (noting that "textual arguments always
come first, ahead of the doctrinal arguments").
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financial reform. Would you hire a retired judge for this purpose? Not
likely. A former policy analyst from the relevant administrative agency
would be a better choice, or an economics or business consulting firm.
Admittedly, judges have some relevant advantages. They are habituated
to engaging in disinterested analysis, and they are attentive to the way in
72
which different facts affect the correctness of reaching different results .
But they are not accustomed to dealing with large databases, they lack
quantitative skills, and they do not tend to think-explicitly at least-in
terms of aggregate welfare models. If one wants texts to be interpreted so
as to maximize social benefits net of costs, we should give all questions of
73
interpretation to administrative agencies.
A good illustration of the pitfalls of welfarist interpretation is
provided by a recent case involving the standard for challenging the fees
charged by investment advisory firms to mutual funds'
Writing for a
panel of the Seventh Circuit, judge Frank Easterbrook drew upon
orthodox Chicago School economics to opine that there is no need for
any legal scrutiny of such fees, because competition between funds for
investor dollars will keep advisors from charging excessive fees .'
Dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc, judge- Richard Posner
argued that judge Easterbrook's views were out of date and that more
recent economic research indicates that investment advisors can extract
excessive fees from individual investors .' Both the Easterbrook and the
Posner opinions were exercises in welfarist interpretation. The
contending judges, both former Professors at the University of Chicago
Law School, disagreed with each other on grounds of economic theory
and evidence.
The Supreme Court granted further review, and in a unanimous
opinion written by justice Alito, reaffirmed the traditional multi-factor
standard for review of investment advisory fees, as first articulated by the
Second Circuit in a decision rendered in 1982 .~ justice Alito observed
that the Second Circuit standard "may lack sharp analytical clarity," but it
"accurately reflects the compromise" embodied in the statute, and "has
provided a workable standard for nearly three decades.",78 He then
remarked that the debate between judges Easterbrook and Posner
"regarding today's mutual fund market is a matter for Congress, not the

VERMEULE, supra note 35, at 3.
Vermeule has concluded-correctly, in my view-that if welfarist
interpretation is the proper mode of interpretation, courts should routinely defer to
administrative agency decisions. See id. at 1.
7Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1422 (2010).
7Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 627, 634 (7th Cir. 2008).
"Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 730-31 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en hanc).
77Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 928-30 (2d Cir.
1982).
7Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1430.
72
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Perhaps this rebuke will discourage further explorations in

Courts.",79

welfarist interpretation. In any event, it is interesting to note that the
Supreme Court was able to reach unanimous agreement upon the mode
of analysis to use in delivering this rebuke-a quintessential exercise in
integrative interpretation, relying on arguments from precedent
(including lower court precedent), ratification, and reliance.
The case against the use of welfarist interpretation by judges and
lawyers is slightly harder to make if the analysis is of the natural-rights or
human-rights variety, as we tend to find in the literature on constitutional
interpretation. But I am prepared to make it. just as judges and lawyers
do not have the skill set to engage in complex economic analysis, so they
also do not have the skill set to engage in sophisticated moral
philosophy." There is a tendency among constitutional theorists of a
moralizing bent, like Dworkin, to valorize courts as the "Forum of
Principle.""' But fewv judges qualify as deep thinkers, at least of the sort
who would command natural deference for their insights about universal
moral truths. When Anthony Kennedy, the most powerful justice on the
Supreme Court today, starts to rhapsodize about the "right to define
one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life ," the effect is simply embarrassing.
Those who urge judges to interpret vague constitutional texts in light
of universal moral truths also have a strong tendency to dwell on past
judicial heroics (or imagined heroics) rather than contemporary
conundrums. They nearly always appeal to propositions that are today
uncontroversial, such the wrongfulness of segregation or of denying
equal rights to women, ignoring the halting process by which courts
actually came to embrace these propositions. Ex post, we can see that
they reflect moral principles we are prepared to call universal. We can
shower hosannas on courts for their perspicacity in aligning themselves
on the correct side of the issue. But it is much more difficult to mount a
persuasive case that judges should use moral philosophy to decide issues
that are deeply controversial today, such as whether to permit late-term
elective abortions or how to strike a balance between public security and
individual liberty in monitoring communications among suspected
terrorists. Considerations of moral philosophy are obviously relevant in
trying to answer these questions. But do we really believe thatjudges have
better insights into finding the right answers to these questions, based on
moral reasoning, than do other decision-makers or ordinary citizens?

71Id.

at 1431.

8' See, eg., RICH-ARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS Or MORALi AND LEGAL THEORY,
129-41 (1999) (discussing the limited impact of moral theory on Supreme Court
decisions).
8RONALD

8Planned

opinion).

DwoRKIN, A MIA-irER OF PRINCIPLE 33 (1985).
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)

(joint
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The second overriding concern involves the need for stability in
interpretation. Integrative interpretation rates high on stability, since the
more settled or entrenched an interpretation becomes, the harder it is to
displace it under an integrative model of interpretation. Faithful agent
interpretation rates slightly less highly on the stability scale, since the
faithful agent is always trying to discern the meaning at a fixed point in
time in the past. As this point in time recedes, new materials that bear on
original understanding may be discovered, and new perspectives on how
to interpret the past may emerge that are based on changing societal
values and experience. So the understanding of original meaning one
hundred years after enactment may differ significantly from the
understanding of original meaning ten years after enactment. Avulsive
changes based on sincere faithful agent interpretation cannot be ruled
out.

83

Still,

faithful agent interpreters will be looking at the same words

and the same context of enactment. This will tend to confine the range
of possible meanings.
Welfarist interpretation, by comparison, seems to be an open
invitation to instability in interpretation. Cost-benefit analysis is
notoriously sensitive to changes in the measurement of variables- or the
discovery of new variables. Pollution that does not warrant control one
year can suddenly become a matter of regulatory concern the next, or
vice versa, as measurement improves, populations shift, and technology
changes . 4 Interpretation of texts using cost-benefit analysis would have
the same shifting aspect, even if done by totally competent practitioners
of the art-as opposed to incompetent judges. Interpretation drawing
upon moral reasoning is subject to similar shifting perspectives. Sexual
relations between members of the same gender can be regarded as
morally abhorrent in one generation, and normal or even healthy in the
next." Likewise, the rights of unborn fetuses or animals can be
considered of small moment in one era, and matters of great significance
in another. Welfarist interpretation, at least in a relatively pure or
untethered form, would therefore be highly unstable, as compared to
either integrative or faithful agent interpretation.
The problem is compounded when we consider that different
interpreters are likely to have different views about how social welfare can
be advanced through interpretation. Faithful agent interpretation has a
theory that collectively binds interpreters-they are bound by the
instructions of the enacting body. Integrative interpretation similarly has
83 Arguably, Heller, in which the Court interpreted the Second Amendment more
than 200 years after its adoption to embody an individual's right to bear arms for selfprotection, reflects such a change. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783
(2008).
FU
84 See ge"nrally Lisa Heinzerling, !iegulatory Cos~ts of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE
1981 (1998) (providing illuistrations of the sensitivity of cost-benefit analysis to small
changes in variables).
85 See Chai R. Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Liberty: Gay Rights and Religion, 72
BROOK. L. Rrv. 61, 77-79 (2006).
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a theory that collectively binds interpreters-they are bound by
precedent or by propositions about the meaning of texts that can be
regarded as settled."( What is it that binds one judge or other interpreter
to the welfare analysis carried out by another judge or interpreter?
Welfarist interpretation is only controlling if one agrees that the analysis
is correct. If you disagree with a welfarist analysis rendered by someone
else-either because you have better data, you are smarter, or your moral
values are superior-you have no reason to follow the lead of the other
welfaristi' A world of welfarist interpretation would therefore be a world
of continuous revisitings of previous decisions, dramatic shifts in legal
understanding with new appointments, and rampant overruling of prior
interpretations.
What is the case on the other side? One argument commonly
advanced in support of welfarist interpretation is that it is necessary in
order to keep enacted texts up-to-date. 8 The Constitution, in particular,
is notoriously difficult to amend. A very strong consensus must emerge,
and a very strong motivation for change must gather steam, before twothirds of the House and Senate and three-fourths of the States will agree
to amend the Constitution. It is also difficult to amend statutes. Congress
has only a limited capacity to move legislation through the bicameral
approval process, especially given the need to obtain the assent of the
President or a two-thirds vote to overcome a veto. If all significant
statutory change must come from Congress, then quite a number of
obsolete laws will gather on the books, frustrating the general welfare.
The conclusion drawn from these laments about the difficulty of
updating the law is that interpreters should do the updating by adopting
some form of welfarist interpretaion. '
This claim seems to me to be overstated. For one thing, it ignores
other mechanisms for legal change. If the Constitution is too difficult to
amend, then statutory rights can be created that will have virtually the
same effect. Discrimination against the elderly or the disabled, for
example, has not been recognized as triggering significant constitutional
protection.)0 Yet Congress has passed the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act,'' the Amiericans With Disabilities Act, ' 2 and other

"6 See, eg, Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 279 (1972).
17

Cf VERMEULE,

supra note 35, at 118-48 (discussing the difficulties of achieving

coordination amongjudges in pursuit of some normative objective).
" See, eg., 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLEr: TRANsFORMATIONs 312-44 (1998)

(arguing that President Roosevelt and his advisors concluded it was impractical to
seek to amend the Constitution and that changing Supreme Court personnel was a
better strategy to enshrine the principles of the New Deal).
89 See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATIIEs 2 (1982)
(proposing thatjudges assume the power to disregard "obsolete" statutes).
'See City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446
(1985) (disability); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (age).
"' Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006).
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statutes that protect the elderly and the disabled against discrimination.
Similar stories can be told about discrimination based on race, gender,
religion, and sexual orientation . Congress is also a ware that statutes are
difficult to amend and keep up to date. For this reason, Congress often
delegates broad authority to administrative agencies, which can do the
updating at a lower cost using broad rulemaking authority.
Another problem with relying on updating through interpretation is
that this mode of legal change also requires a very strong consensus and
eagerness to change the law on the part of the interpreters, such as the
judges. Suppose the issue is one on which society is divided, such as
whether to recognize gay marriage. If society is divided, then it is likely
that the judges will be divided too. The Ninth Circuit may recognize a
constitutional right to gay marriage, but if it does, the Supreme Court,
given its current composition, is likely to nix it. judges will only act in a
coordinated and decisive fashion to change the law through
interpretation when enough time has passed to allow a succession of
sympathetic Presidents and Senates to appoint a majority of judges who
are also sympathetic to the change .' Given the increased life expectancy
of judges 9 5 this may take quite a long time. In -the meantime, if we
assume a succession of sympathetic Presidents and Congresses, amending
the Constitution or, better yet, passing a statute, may be a more
expeditious way of proceeding to achieve a desired change.
And of course, overhanging all of this discussion about the need for
legal change is a fundamental question of institutional design. Since
when are unelected and life tenured judges the preferred instrument for
achieving legal change in a society committed to popular sovereignty? To
make this more concrete, suppose we posit a situation in which a certain
change is unambiguously desirable from a social welfare perspective.
Suppose, further, that achieving this change through interpretation will
hasten the happy day when the change arrives by, say, five years relative
to achieving the change by slogging through the political process. We still
have to confront the objection that achieving the change through more

"Equal Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1210112213 (2006).
(prohibiting
" See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006)
employment discrimination based upon "race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin"); Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (2006) (prohibiting
discrimination against federal employees based upon "conduct which does not
adversely affect the performance of the employee").
14 See Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 284-85 (1957).
" The average age of Supreme Court justices at death or resignation from the
Court has risen from 58 years in the early decades of the Court to nearly 80 years
today. See Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Tenm Limits for the Supreme Court: L~fe
Tenure Reconsidered, in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES

24-25 (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006).
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democratic or representational methods is the right way to go in a society
committed to rule by the people.
A second, more subtle, argument in favor of welfarist interpretation
is that such interpretation is appropriate to the extent it promotes the
general norm of government by the people. This is John Ely's famous
argument in support of a limited form of non-faithful agent judicial
review.2 6 Ely argues that a variety of aggressive constitutional rulings
associated with the Warren Court were justified, precisely because they
had the effect of making the political process more responsive to popular
will. judicial review of this variety, Ely argues, is consistent with a "metanorm" of popular sovereignty, and thus comports with the most general
principle of institutional design we have been considering. 9
Although this version of welfarist interpretation appears to be more
compatible with a commitment to popular sovereignty than rootless
pragmatism, on closer examination it too encounters serious objections.
One concern is the meaning of "more democratic." Ely regards it as selfevident that decisions reapportioning electoral districts to conform to the
principle of "one person, one vote,' decisions commanding full equality
for African-Americans and women, and decisions striking down limits on
political speech all make our polity more democratic. But when we push
the inquiry further, we quickly find that the classification becomes more
problematic. Is direct democracy by initiative and referendum more or
Is delegated
democracy?
than representative
less democratic
policymnaking by administrative agencies using notice, comment and
public hearings more or less democratic than direct policymnaking by
elected legislatures? Is an elected judiciary more or less democratic than
an appointed judiciary? There are no obvious answers to these questions,
with the result that a general mandate to judges to remake society in the
name of "democracy" seems hardly more constrained than a mandate to
"do good."
A related objection is that even if we can agree on which structural
option is more democratic, it is not clear that the Constitution requires
that we select this option without regard to countervailing
considerations. To take but one example, consider the choice between
direct and representative democracy. Even if we can agree that direct
democracy is more democratic than representative democracy, it is hard
to maintain that the Constitution authorizes a judicial campaign to
promote the use of direct democracy. The Constitution establishes the
federal government as a representative democracy, not a direct
democracy, and it guarantees the States a "republican form" of
government, not a direct democracy.9 Moreover, because most voters are
rationally ignorant of the details of policy proposals, there is significant
"6 JOHN HART

ELY,

DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:

02 (1980).
17See

generally id. at 83-84, 87, 102-03.
art. W, § 4.

"U.S. CONST.

A

THEORY OFJUDICIAL REVIEW 101-
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evidence that direct democracy is simply a bad idea, at least if conducted
on a state-wide scale.99 Again, the conclusion would seem to be that
charging judges with promoting democracy leads to conundrums beyond
the capacity ofjudges to resolve.
Having said all this, I do not mean to suggest the welfarist
interpretation is always and everywhere forbidden. Sometimes it is
inevitable, and sometimes it is a better choice than all the others.
Suppose, for example, that a new statute or constitutional provision is
adopted, and the text contains a serious ambiguity or gap. Suppose
further that the evidence of legislative intent or purpose is equally
ambiguous or opaque. Finally, suppose that there is no precedent, no
similar enactment, and no established canon of interpretation that yields
an answer. In such circumstances, the interpreter has no choice-other
than declaring the provision nonjusticiable-but to resolve the ambiguity
or close the gap by adopting the interpretation that seems to the
interpreter to achieve the best results under the circumstances. Thus,
although I believe it would be a mistake to adopt welfarist interpretation
as a mode of first resort, I concede that there will be circumstances,
hopefully relatively rare insofar as judicial interpretation is concerned,
when it must be adopted as a mode of last resort.
IV. TWO PRINCIPLES OF SYNTHESIS
The foregoing analysis of the three modes of interpretation reveals
that no single mode, by itself, is going to provide a satisfactory theory of
legal interpretation. Faithful agent theory may be foundational, but in
practice it can quickly run out of gas. Integrative interpretation is
generally far more useful, but it is necessarily subordinate to faithful
agent interpretation and does not offer any satisfactory account of how
the process of interpretation is started. Welfarist interpretation seems the
most alien to judicial traditions, and is better suited to specialized
agencies than to courts of general jurisdiction. But there are occasions
when even courts must resort to welfarist interpretation. How then can
we fit the pieces together? In a preliminary effort to explore how that
might be done, I will offer two principles for achieving a synthesis of
interpretative modes. While these principles do not answer all questions
about how to approach problems of interpretation, they at least promise
to get us started in that direction.
A. A Hierarchy of InterpretativeAuthority
The first basis for achieving a synthesis is to acknowledge a hierarchy
of authority among different modes, together with the recognition that
the modes that exist in a higher position in the hierarchy are inevitably

9See Thomas W. Merrill, Direct Voting by Property Owners, 77
282 (2010) (citing studies).

U. CHI. L. REv. 275,
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incomplete and will require supplementation by modes further down the
hierarchy. Based on the discussion in Part 111, the hierarchy can be stated
easily enough, at least for traditional interpreters like courts. Courts
should start with the faithful agent approach, and interpret texts in
accordance with their plain or uncontested meaning if this is possible.
Once faithful agent interpretation is exhausted, courts should turn to
integrative interpretation and should seek to ascribe meaning to the text
by considering past precedents, interpretations by other branches of
government, other enactments, legislative ratification, and substantive
canons of construction. As a last resort, if and only if both faithful agent
and integrative interpretation fail to produce an answer, courts should
look to welfarist considerations and give the text the meaning that
appears to produce the best results, as far as the court is able to discern.
This hierarchy poses some interesting and important subsidiary
questions. One critical question concerns which version of the faithful
agent inquiry courts should employ. When the text fails to supply a plain
or uncontested meaning, should the court immediately move on to
integrative techniques-as self-proclaimed textualists like justice Scalia
tend to do? Or should the interpreter first explore other faithful agent
approaches, such as intentionalism or purposivism, and turn to
integration only if these alternative faithful agent techniques fail to yield
an answer?'
Another critical question concerns the relative status of different
tools of integrative interpretation. Courts tend to ascribe very significant
weight to their own past exercises in interpretation, 00 but much less
weight to other integrative tools, such as administrative interpretations or
substantive canons. This raises the question of whether courts, once plain
meaning runs out, should move directly to past judicial precedents, but
then perhaps move back to other faithful agent techniques like legislative
intent or purpose if there are no precedents on point or if the
precedents are conflicting. In other words, there is a question of whether
some integrative techniques should be given a status in the hierarchy
higher than some faithful agent techniques, even if, as a general matter,
integrative
should come before
faithful agent interpretation
interpretation.
I have no firm answers to these interesting questions, at least none
that I am prepared to offer here. Arguably there should be no answers to
these questions that apply across the board. After all, evidence of
legislative intent or purpose and strength of precedent are matters of
degree. One could quite plausibly argue that when the text runs out but
evidence of intent is quite strong, interpreters should move first to intent;
conversely, when the text runs out but past precedent is quite strong,
interpreters should move first to precedent. Allowing interpreters the

'00 See, eg., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 277-79 (1972) (applying a super-strong
version of stare decisis to statutory interpretation).
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flexibility to make these subsidiary determinations in a case-by-case
fashion may be perfectly sensible.
A third critical question is whether a different hierarchy should be
adopted for specialized interpreters such as administrative agencies.
Clearly, the general arguments for the primacy of faithful agent
interpretation apply to agency interpreters as well as judicial interpreters.
Agencies no less than courts must comply with uncontested propositions
of enacted law. Picking up on the implications of Chevron,'O however, one
could argue that agencies are much better suited than courts to engage
in welfarist interpretation. Also, given the close relationship between
agencies and the political branches, the case for stability in interpretation
may be less compelling in the agency context, where the election of new
administrations may properly lead to changes in agency policy. All of
which suggests that in some circumstances we might invert the second
and third orders of preference, and encourage agencies to engage in
welfarist interpretation rather than integrative interpretation once the
trail of faithful agent interpretation turns cold.10
The only point I insist upon is that, at least for courts, the general
hierarchy of interpretation among the three modes should be: faithful
agent > integrative > welfarist. This is a significant starting point for
moving on to more refined questions about subsidiary methods and the
proper treatment of specialized interpreters, and provides significant
clarification about interpretational debates.
B. Implied Delegations of Integrative and Welfarist Authority
A second and complementary principle for achieving a synthesis
among interpretative modes is the idea of implied delegation. Faithful
agent theories of statutory interpretation have long recognized that one
possible interpretation of the meaning of a text is that the enacting body
has delegated authority to some interpreter to fill in the blanks left by the
enactor. We have grown accustomed to speaking this way in the
administrative law context in the wake of the Chevron decision, where it is
now common to see references to implied delegations to administrative
federal antitrust laws entail an
agencies to interpret statutes. 13Also,

'0' 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
"'2 SeeJerry L. Mashaw, Normns, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Pretiminary
Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REv. 501, 504 (2005)
(suggesting that sensible principles for agency interpretation might look different
from those we associate with judicial interpretation).
102 See, eg, Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
967, 980 (2005) ("in Chevron, this Court held that ambiguities in statutes within an
agency's jurisdiction to administer are delegations of authority to the agency to fill
the statutory gap in reasonable fashion."); Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638,
649 (1990) ("A precondition to deference under Chevron is a congressional
delegation of administrative authority."). For an argument that this is the preferred
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implied delegation to Courts to develop subordinate principles that
define the meaning of combinations and conspiracies "in restraint of
trade or commerce."""4 So, in principle, Congress can also delegate broad
authority to courts to develop a Subordinate body of law.
The idea of implied delegation is an attractive basis for synthesis
because it suggests a way in which all three modes of interpretation might
be drawn together and rationalized under the rubric of faithful agent
interpretation. In effect, one can imagine a world consisting of three
interpretative alternatives: (1) the enacting body decides a matter for
itself, and its instructions are faithfully carried out by the interpreter; (2)
the enacting body does not decide a matter itself, but delegates authority
to a particular interpreter to elaborate on the meaning of the enactment
using techniques of integrative interpretation; or (3) the enacting body
does not decide a matter itself, but delegates authority to a particular
interpreter to elaborate on the meaning of the enactment using
techniques of welfarist interpretation. In such a world, all modes of
interpretation are traced back to instructions given by the enacting body,
and hence all modes of inter-pretation partake of the strong justifications
for faithful agent interpretation. Instead of a plurality of theories of
legitimacy in interpretation, all ultimately reduce to some variant of
faithful agent interpretation.
The concept of implied delegation also allows us to accommodate
variations in the hierarchy of inter-pretational modes across different
interpreters and possibly also across different areas of law. We might
conclude, for example, that Congress has delegated authority to courts to
supplement faithful agent interpretation with integrative inter-pretation,
but has delegated authority to specialized agencies to supplement faithful
agent interpretation with welfarist interpretation. Or we might conclude
that the Framers of the Constitution delegated authority to courts to
engage in welfarist interpretation when courts first "liquidate" the
meaning of a broad constitutional provision, and thereafter to engage in
integrativeinepeao.10
There are, of course, a number of difficulties presented by this
potential synthesis. The framers of the Constitution did not explicitly
delegate authority to anyone to flesh out the meaning of the Constitution
through interpretation. So any delegation of interpretational authority
foundation for the Chevron doctrine, see Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman,
Chevron 's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 870-73 (2001).
'"" See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof' I Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978)
(stating that Congress, in passing the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. .§1, "expected the
courts to give shape to the statute's broad mandate by draw'ing on common-law
tradition"). For discussion, see Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: judicially
Administered Statutes and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REv. 405 (2008);
Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers oJFederal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REvr. 1, 4445 (1985).
See Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Inteopretive Conventions, 70 U. C-HI. L. REv.
519, 598 (2003).
105
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under the Constitution necessarily would be implied rather than express.
Congress from time to time does expressly delegate authority to fill in the
blanks of a statute, either to courts or, more commonly, to administrative
agencies.'06 But again, the primary source of delegated interpretational
authority is implied rather than express.
Identifying implied delegations is inherently problematic. From the
faithful agent perspective, one must have sound reasons to believe that
the enactor has in fact chosen to make a delegation of authority to future
interpreters. The use of broad language in the text is one piece of
circumstantial evidence in support of such an inference, but it is not
conclusive. Sometimes broad language can be taken as an implied
delegation, but other times it should be taken as an incorporation of
historical understandings, or perhaps as nothing but precatory language
not meant to be taken literally.
In deter-mining whether an implied delegation has been made and
what type of interpretational authority has been delegated, the course of
dealing or course of conduct between principal and agent is illuminating.
Suppose Congress passes a broadly worded statute to be enforced by the
courts. The courts then interpret the statute using techniques of
integrative interpretation. Later, Congress reenacts the statute, leaving
the same broad language in place. This course of conduct can give rise to
the inference that Con gress has ratified the approach to interpretation
followed by the court.' In the language of faithful agent theory, one
could say that the principal impliedly ratified an assumption by the agent
that it was delegated authority to interpret the enactment using
integrative methods.' 08 Similar reasoning could be applied to ratify an
assumption of authority to interpret using welfarist interpretation.
As this example suggests, it is much easier in the statutory than in the
constitutional context to determine whether the enacting body has
impliedly delegated interpretative authority and, if so, what kind. In the
statutory context, interpreters have the advantage of considerable give
and take with legislatures. The antitrust laws, for example, were not at
first clearly regarded as a delegation of authority to courts to engage in
delegated lawmaking. 09This characterization emerged only over time, as
courts experimented with different interpretations, and Congress seemed
to acquiesce in this process ofjudicial lawmaking, both by not interfering
See, e.g, Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416 (1977) (discussing federal statute
delegating authority to Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to define
.unemployment").
107 The ratification doctrine, of course, ordinarily applies where the legislature
has re-enacted a statute after it has been authoritatively interpreted as having a
particular meaning. See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 792 (1998).
106

''See

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY

§ 4.01 cmt. b (2006).

'~0 See, e.g., United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 279 (6th Cir.
1898), mod qied and affd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (Taft, C.J.) (characterizing the Sherman
Act as an affirmative prohibition of those contracts that would have been
unenforceable at common law).
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with the judicial work product and by adopting amendments that built
on priorjudicial understandings.'"
In constitutional law, in contrast, the extreme difficulty of adopting
amendments deprives the courts of important feedback about their
assumption of delegated lawmaking power. Consider, for example, the
Warren Court's vast expansion of constitutional criminal procedural
protections starting in the 1960s."' Did "We the People" ratify the Court's
assumption of delegated authority to craft a code of constitutional
criminal procedural rules and impose this code on the States? Or was
opposition to this enterprise simply too diffuse, allowing the Court to
seize a certain policy space without fear of retaliation? Quite likely we will
never know.
Another difficult issue presented by the idea of implied delegation
concerns which institution is intended to be the delegatee. Even if we
conclude that particular provisions of the Constitution were originally
understood as delegating authority to future interpreters to flesh out the
meaning of broad terms through interpretation, the question remains
which interpreter was understood to be the recipient of this delegation.
This is a familiar problem in statutory interpretation post-Chevron. Did
Congress delegate interpretative authority to the agency or to the court?
The Court has concluded that the agency is the presumed delegatee if
certain conditions are met; otherwise it is the court.12
A nettlesome example involves the Fourteenth Amendment. If we
pay particular attention to the text, as the faithful agent perspective
would surely have us do, then it is hard to understand how the
Fourteenth Amendment is properly read as delegating authority to the
courts to implement the broad principles of section 1, as opposed to
delegating authority to Congress to do so. There is nothing in the text
about a delegation to the courts. Section 5, however, says that "[tihe
Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article."' 13An approach to constitutional interpretation
that stresses the text supplemented by the principle of implied
delegation would have some work to do in showing how the document
"'0 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. P51(5, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 904-06
(2007) (reaffirming that the Sherman Act confers authority on courts to determine
the legal standard for assessing resale price maintenance and construing a series of
congressional enactments regarding resale price maintenance as acquiescing in that
understanding).
'1See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (mandating specific
warnings that must be given to suspects before interrogation); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (requiring that states exclude from trials evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment).
11'
See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) (holding that
agency interpretations are entitled to Chevron deference only if Congress has
delegated authority to act with the force of law and the interpretation is rendered
pursuant to the exercise of such atuthority).
"'

U.S. CONST.

amend. XIV, § 5.
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delegates power to courts, as opposed to Congress, to develop an
4
elaborate jurisprudence that claims the authority of constitutional law."
V. OTHER IMPLICATIONS
My proposed typology of interpretive methods, and the
understanding that each plays a role in the actual practice of
inter-pretation, has specific payoffs in terms of contemporary debates
about legal interpretation. I will suggest three.
A.

The Incompleteness of Textualism

The textualist school of statutory interpretation, which burst on the
scene in the late 1980s through the advocacy of justice Scalia,"'- has been
resisted by most judges and scholars. But it is unquestionably energetic,
and has put other approaches to statutory interpretation on the
defensive. As the foregoing discussion should reveal, however, textualism
is radically incomplete as a theory of interpretation.
Textualism is regarded by, its proponents as a type of faithful agent
theory." 6 It seeks to ascertain the instructions of the enacting body by
asking what an ordinary reader would understand the text to mean,
taking into account the context in which the words are used.' 7The
problem is that in any difficult case requiring interpretation the ordinary
meaning of the text is ambiguous, or is vague, or it leaves a gap by failing
to address the particular question at all. What is a textualist interpreter to
do in these circumstances? Try as they might, textualists cannot tease out
the answer to every question of interpretation by vigorously massaging
the words of the text."' Instead, they must look to precedents, other
enactments, substantive canons, administrative interpretations and the
like. In other words, textualists must shift to an integrative mode of
interpretation.
Alternatively,
they make arguments about the
consequences of adopting one interpretation versus another. In other
words, they must shift to a welfarist mode of interpretation. But these
shifts are not acknowledged to be departures from the faithful agent

"' This of course, is the opposite of the position the Court has taken. See City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (claiming that the power to enforce does
not include "the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation"which is for judges to decide).
1For the circumstances surrotunding the birth of modern textualism, see
William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rrv. 621, 623 (1990).
116 See, e.g,John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L.
Rrv. 1, 18 (2001).
17Id.

at 16.

See, eg., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 731-33 (2006) (plurality
opinion of Scalia, J.) (attempting to give meaning to the phrase "navigable waters of
the United States" by considering dictionary definitions of "waters").
"'
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enterprise, which textualists regard as foundational.' 0 , This leaves
textualism Underspecified and unjustified in most of its applications.
Indeed, textualism is a very thin faithful agent theory. Other faithful
agent theories are more robust. When the text runs out, an intentionalist
or a purposivist can turn to evidence of the intentions or purposes of the
enacting body in an effort to resolve the interpretative issue. Textualism,
in contrast, denounces these alternative faithful agent approaches as
so doing, the textualist must necessarily turn to some
illegitimate. 121In
other mode of interpretation besides the faithful agent mode. Yet we do
not have an account from the textualist perspective as to why, given their
foundational commitment to faithful agent interpretation, these
alternative modes are legitimate.
Since textualism cannot possibly be a complete theory of
interpretation, we cannot meaningfully assess the debate between
textualists and their adversaries until the textualists spell out what it is
they intend to use when the textualist method runs out, and why. What
textualists need, in other words, is an account of the proper role and
function of integrative and welfarist interpretation in the interpretative
process. Until textutalists acknowledge this, their theory of interpretation
will remain incomplete and unjustified.
B.

The Empty Idea of Nonoriginalism

When we turn to constitutional interpretation, we find a debate
between "originalism" and "nonoriginalism." Originalism breaks down
into the usual subcategories of the faithful agent mode of
interpretation-textualism, intentionalism, and purposivism. But what
exactly is "nonoriginalism?" At one time, those who opposed originalism
2
in constitutional law said they were in favor of a "living Constitution."1 1
The vacuity of this concept has apparently led to its quiet abandonment.
Nevertheless, most constitutional law scholars continue to oppose
obvious question is: What exactly is it that they do
originalism. 1'The
embrace?
One possibility, which emerges during public occasions like
Supreme Court confirmation hearings, is that a nonoriginalist is
someone who supports following precedent. Originalism is denounced
on these occasions as an effort to turn back the clock on racial

"'See generally Manning, supYra note 116, at 18, 105-15.
See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 8, at 18-29.
121 See William H. Rehnquist,
The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REv.
693 (1976) (referring to questions posed to nominees in judicial confirmation
hearings). On the migration of erstwhile proponents of living constitutionalism into
the camp of originalism, albeit of the broad purposive variety, see Ethan J. Leib, The
PerpetualAnxiety of Living Constitutionalis~m, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 353 (2007).
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integration, access to contraceptives, and equality for women. 2 3 A
nonoriginalist, in contrast, is depicted as a sensible person who favors
Supreme Court precedents that endorse these happy, consensual results.
Another possibility, which is more likely to be found between the covers
of law reviews, is that a nonoriginalist is someone who supports welfarist
interpretation, most likely of the universal human rights variety. 21 4 In
these settings, the nonoriginalist emerges as someone who would
reconstitute the Supreme Court in the image of the Warren Court, and
use adjudication as an engine of social reform. Unfortunately, by shifting
back and forth between these conceptions of the alternative to
originalism, nonoriginalists end up appearing to have no principled
theory of interpretation at all.
Recent literature suggests that there are two potentially promising
strategies available to those who oppose conventional originalism. One,
which has been mapped out by Jack Balkin and Aharon Barak, is to
embrace a form of purposivism. 125 This allows the opponent of
conventional originalism to embrace the mantle of the faithful agent,
indeed, to proclaim that he too is an originalist, rightly understood. What
the agent is faithful to under this conception, however, is an extremely
abstract statement of the "purposes" of the enacting body, usually
described in terms like promoting "equal citizenship," "political justice,"
or "human flourishing." Balkin, for example, has argued that a broad
right to abortion is required by the original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment, understood to incorporate an "anti-subordination"

principle. 12
The other promising strategy, which has been mapped out by

Eskridge and Dworkin, 17is

to adopt a highly normativized version of

integrative interpretation. This emphasizes the need to reach outcomes
that integrate all relevant legal material, but adds a large dollop of moral
theory to the Mix. 1"Not coincidentally, the moral theory generates
outcomes congenial to left-progressives. Depending on how large the
component of moralizing is relative to the more conventional legal
elements, this version of integrative theory also has the potential to segue
into a type of pure welfarisni.
As should be clear, I do not endorse either of these strategies. Both
appear to be efforts to re-package welfarismn of the left-progressive variety
as something else-purposivismn or integrative interpretation. My point is
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simply that the failure of the opponents of conventional originalism to
coalesce around one of these two strategies has made it seem, to casual
observers at confirmation hearings and the like, that the choice is
between originalism and something fuzzy and ill-defined, but which
appears to be welfarist interpretation of the left-progressive variety. Given
this choice, the future of "nonoriginalism" is not very bright, since there
is not much public Support for this brand of welfarist interpretation by
judges. Again, greater attention to the full range of interpretative modes
on the part of those who oppose originalism in constitutional law would
lead to a clearer contrast between the alternatives in constitutional
interpretation.
C.

The Corrosive Nature of Pragmatism

Finally, we can see how pragmatism, if advanced as a first order
theory of interpretation, is deeply unsettling. If the only standard for
assessing the validity of an interpretation is whether it advances or retards
the public welfare, then everything is up for grabs. Someone like Posner
can explain that a pragmatic interpreter will take into account the need
to respect legislative supremacy, to promote stability in the law, and to
minimize the costs of adjudication.' 12 The savvy pragmatist judge,
according to Posner, after mulling these factors, may conclude that
something that looks like faithful agent interpretation or that appears to
be integrative interpretation is in fact the hest approach in a given case.13
But this is not the way most interpreters understand the enterprise in
which they are engaged. When the instructions of the enacting body are
plain, they regard it as their legal duty to enforce those instructions. And
when the pattern of the law is settled, they regard it as their legal duty to
For the thoroughgoing
preserve these settled understandings.
pragmatist, however, these concessions to convention are grounded in a
calculus about consequences. They are faux exercises in faithful agent or
integrative interpretation, adopted by the pragmatist because-all things
considered-they Aill produce better results. Like Dostoevsky's Grand
Inquisitor," the pragmatistjudge adopts the pose of the faithful agent or
the integrator, but only because preserving these illusions %ill produce a
better society. For mostjudges, such a pose is not sustainable. In the long
run, it would be deeply corrosive, and would sap the institution of law of
much of its strength.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Once we break free of the standard debates about interpretationtextualism versus intentionalism and originalism versus nonoriginalismwe can see that there are in fact three competing modes of
interpretation, which encompass a number of sub-modes or versions. In
practice, all interpreters are faithful agents, integrators, and welfarists.
But they do not and should not embrace these modes of interpretation
in random order or in equal parts. Given some basic assumptions about
the design of our political institutions, most importantly the premise of
popular sovereignty, we know that the faithful agent perspective has
primacy of place, integrative interpretation will serve as the day-to-day
workhorse, and welfarist interpretation should be a mode of last resort.
Among the payoffs from adopting this wider-angle lens on
inter-pretation, we can see some of the standard battles over
interpretation in a different light. Textualism is radically incomplete,
nonoriginalism is an empty suit, and pragmatism misdescribes the
essential nature of the interpretative enterprise. There is much more to
say, but I hope that what I have said at least suggests that this is a
promising way of thinking about a very important legal activity.

